

Exercises: Lesson 3.4 – DeFi, Stablecoins, and Tokenomics
Module 3: The Trust Problem

Prof. Dr. Joerg Osterrieder

Exercise 1: AMM Price Calculations

A constant product AMM pool holds 5,000 ETH and 10,000,000 USDC.

Tasks:

- a. What is the constant k ? What is the current implied price of 1 ETH?
- b. A trader buys 200 ETH from the pool. Calculate the new USDC reserve, the amount of USDC the trader pays, and the effective price per ETH.
- c. After the trade in (b), a second trader buys another 200 ETH. Calculate the effective price per ETH for this second trade. Why is it higher than the first trade?
- d. Both traders together bought 400 ETH. If instead a single trader bought all 400 ETH in one transaction, what would the effective price per ETH be? Compare with the average of the two sequential trades.
- e. A pool charges a 0.3% fee on each trade (deducted from the input token before the swap). Recalculate part (b) with the fee included. How much goes to liquidity providers?

Exercise 2: Impermanent Loss Calculation

A liquidity provider deposits 10 ETH and 20,000 USDC into an AMM pool when $\text{ETH} = \$2,000$.

Impermanent loss formula: $IL = \frac{2\sqrt{r}}{1+r} - 1$ where $r = P_{\text{new}}/P_{\text{old}}$.

Tasks:

- a. What is the initial total value of the LP's position?
- b. ETH rises to \$3,000 ($r = 1.5$). Calculate the impermanent loss as a percentage.
- c. Convert the percentage from (b) to a dollar loss. What is the LP's pool value vs. the HODL value?
- d. The pool earned 1.2% in trading fees during this period. Was providing liquidity profitable compared to holding?
- e. ETH drops to \$1,000 ($r = 0.5$). Calculate IL. Is the impermanent loss symmetric for equal-magnitude price moves up and down?
- f. At what annual fee yield does the LP break even if ETH price doubles over one year ($r = 2.0$)?

Exercise 3: DeFi Lending and Liquidation

A borrower deposits 20 ETH at \$2,500/ETH as collateral and borrows 25,000 USDC from a lending protocol. The protocol's parameters are:

- Minimum collateralization ratio: 150%
- Liquidation threshold: 130%
- Liquidation bonus: 5%
- Borrow APR: 4%

Tasks:

- a) What is the initial collateralization ratio?
- b) At what ETH price does the position reach the 150% minimum ratio? At what price is it liquidated (130%)?
- c) ETH drops to \$1,700. A liquidator repays 12,500 USDC of the debt. How much ETH does the liquidator receive (including the 5% bonus)?
- d) After the partial liquidation in (c), what is the borrower's remaining collateral (in ETH), remaining debt, and new collateralization ratio at \$1,700/ETH?
- e) If the borrower had also accumulated 6 months of interest at 4% APR before liquidation, how does the outstanding debt change? Recalculate the liquidation price.

Exercise 4: Flash Loan Arbitrage

An arbitrageur observes that Token X trades at \$9.80 on DEX A and \$10.20 on DEX B. They execute a flash loan to exploit the spread.

Parameters:

- Flash loan amount: 1,000,000 USDC
- Flash loan fee: 0.09%
- DEX A trading fee: 0.3%
- DEX B trading fee: 0.3%
- Gas cost: \$50 per transaction (3 transactions total: borrow, buy, sell/repay)

Tasks:

- Calculate the flash loan fee in USDC.
- The trader buys Token X on DEX A. After the 0.3% trading fee, how much USDC actually goes toward purchasing tokens? How many Token X units are acquired?
- The trader sells all Token X on DEX B. After the 0.3% trading fee, how much USDC is received?
- Calculate total costs (flash loan fee + gas). What is the net profit or loss?
- What is the **minimum** price spread between DEX A and DEX B for this arbitrage to be profitable, given these fee parameters?

Exercise 5: Stablecoin Mechanism Comparison

Consider three stablecoins:

- **Coin F:** Fiat-backed, claims 100% reserves in cash and US Treasuries
- **Coin C:** Crypto-backed, requires 150% ETH collateral, liquidation at 130%
- **Coin A:** Algorithmic, uses a mint/burn mechanism with governance token GOV

Tasks:

- a) Fill in the comparison table:

Dimension	Coin F	Coin C	Coin A
Decentralization			
Capital efficiency			
Primary de-peg risk			
Regulatory risk			

- b) Coin F's quarterly audit reveals only 85% of reserves are in cash/Treasuries; 15% is in commercial paper. Explain the de-peg risk this creates.
- c) ETH crashes 50% in one day. Walk through the chain of events for Coin C. Does it survive?
- d) During a market panic, Coin A drops to \$0.95. The algorithm mints GOV tokens to buy back Coin A. If GOV is also falling, explain the death spiral mathematically.

Exercise 6: Tokenomics Analysis

A new DeFi protocol launches with the following tokenomics:

- Total supply: 1,000,000,000 tokens
- Distribution: Team 20%, Investors 15%, Community rewards 40%, Treasury 15%, Public sale 10%
- Team vesting: 1-year cliff, then linear over 3 years
- Investor vesting: 6-month cliff, then linear over 2 years
- Community rewards: emitted over 5 years with annual halving

Tasks:

- a How many tokens are in circulation at launch (day 0)? Assume only the public sale tokens are immediately liquid.
- b Calculate the circulating supply at month 6, month 12, and month 24. (Hint: handle each vesting schedule separately.)
- c If the token price at launch is \$0.50, what is the fully diluted valuation (FDV)? What is the market cap based on circulating supply?
- d At month 12, the team cliff unlocks. If 50% of team tokens are sold immediately, what sell pressure (in dollars at \$0.50/token) hits the market?
- e The protocol burns 1% of all trading fees. If daily volume is \$10M and the fee is 0.3%, how many tokens are burned annually (at \$0.50/token)?

Exercise 7: DeFi Attack Analysis

Classify each of the following exploits by attack type (reentrancy, oracle manipulation, flash loan, governance). Then propose one defense for each.

- a. An attacker calls a `withdraw()` function that sends ETH before updating the balance. The attacker's contract calls `withdraw()` again in the fallback function, draining \$3.6M.
- b. An attacker borrows \$50M via flash loan, buys a large amount of Token Y on a DEX (moving the price from \$5 to \$12), then uses Token Y as collateral on a lending protocol (which reads the DEX spot price) to borrow \$30M in stablecoins.
- c. An attacker flash-borrows 1M governance tokens, creates and votes on a proposal to transfer the protocol's \$8M treasury to their address, and returns the tokens — all in one transaction.
- d. An attacker monitors the mempool, sees a large buy order on a DEX, and submits a buy order with higher gas to get executed first (sandwich attack). After the victim's trade moves the price up, the attacker sells at the higher price.

Exercise 8: DeFi Risk Assessment

You are advising a university endowment fund considering allocating 2% of its portfolio to DeFi yield farming. The proposed strategy is to provide liquidity to an ETH/USDC AMM pool earning 12% APY in fees plus 8% APY in governance token rewards.

Tasks:

- a List the **five** distinct risk categories the endowment faces (beyond standard market risk). For each, provide a one-sentence description.
- b If ETH moves $\pm 30\%$ over the year, calculate the impermanent loss using the IL formula. Does the 12% fee yield cover it?
- c The 8% reward is paid in the protocol's governance token. If the governance token drops 60% over the year, what is the effective reward in dollar terms?
- d Assuming all risks materialize at moderate severity (ETH -30% , governance token -60% , smart contract exploit probability 5% causing 100% loss), calculate the expected annual return.
- e Would you recommend this allocation? Justify your answer in 3–4 sentences, considering the endowment's risk tolerance and fiduciary duty.