L04: RegTech & Compliance

Extended Slides – BSc Digital Finance Course

Digital Finance

What Will You Be Able to Do After This Lecture?

1. Formalize the information asymmetry between banks and regulators as a principal-agent monitoring problem
2. Implement a rule-based AML transaction monitoring system in Python and measure its false positive rate
3. Apply Benford's Law to detect transaction manipulation and structuring
4. Build a basic network analysis pipeline for shell company detection using graph metrics
5. Use NLP techniques (TF-IDF) to parse and classify regulatory text
6. Evaluate RegTech system effectiveness using calibration curves, precision-recall, and the AML alert funnel

Prerequisites: Python (pandas, networkx, sklearn), basic statistics, L04 main lecture content.

These six objectives span theory (1), implementation (2–4), NLP (5), and evaluation (6).



Total transparency is not the same as total awareness.

The transparency paradox: the more regulators demand to see, the harder it becomes to see what matters.

How Do Economists Model the Regulator-Bank Relationship?

Principal-Agent Monitoring Problem

Regulator (principal) maximizes social welfare:

$$W = \alpha \cdot \text{Stability} + \beta \cdot \text{Inclusion} - \gamma \cdot \text{Crime}$$

Bank (agent) maximizes profit:

$$\Pi = \text{Revenue} - \text{Compliance Cost} - E[\text{Fines}]$$

Information asymmetry: Regulator observes reports $\mathbf{r}$, not true bank behavior $\mathbf{b}$.

Bank's optimization:

$$\min_{\mathbf{r}} C(\mathbf{r}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad P(\text{fine} \mid \mathbf{r}) \leq \epsilon$$

Banks minimize compliance **cost** while keeping fine probability below a threshold – not maximizing detection.

Result: Banks over-report (defensive SARs) to minimize fine probability, NOT to maximize crime detection.

Intuition

The regulator cannot observe what the bank actually does. They can only observe what the bank **reports**.

The bank knows more about its own transactions than the regulator (information asymmetry).

Compliance is the **signal** the bank sends to convince the regulator it is behaving.

Like all signals, it can be honest or strategic.

Connection to L03: This is the same principal-agent problem, but with different actors (regulator–bank vs lender–borrower).

Banks optimize for minimizing fine probability, not maximizing crime detection. The incentive structure explains why more reports do not mean more safety.

How Much Have Banks Paid for Getting Compliance Wrong?



Top 3 AML/sanctions fines:

- BNP Paribas: $8.9B (sanctions evasion)
- Goldman Sachs: $2.9B (1MDB scandal)
- Danske Bank: $2B (AML failures)

Pattern: Fines cluster around specific failure types – sanctions evasion, correspondent banking, beneficial ownership gaps.

Total exceeds **$50B in AML/sanctions fines since 2012**. This is the cost of compliance **failure**.

Many fines were for violations that occurred **while the bank was filing SARs** – the reports were filed but the crime continued.

Over $50B in AML fines since 2012 – yet fines have not measurably reduced money laundering. The deterrent effect is questionable.

Where Does the Compliance Budget Actually Go?

Compliance Cost Breakdown: 2018 vs 2025



Cost structure (2025):

- Staff dominates at 55% – most compliance is still done by humans
- Technology growing: 20% in 2025, up from 12% in 2018
- Training, legal, audit make up the rest

The shift from staff to technology IS the RegTech story.

A bank spending 55% on staff and 20% on technology is in **transition**. The endgame: technology share grows to 40%+, staff shifts from **data processing** to **judgment**.

Compliance is a $270B global industry. The shift from staff to technology is the RegTech transformation in one chart.

Why Has SAR Volume Quadrupled While Crime Detection Stayed Flat?



Volume growth: 1.0M (2010) to 4.6M (2023) – a 4.6× increase in 13 years.

Each regulatory event (vertical dashed lines in chart) triggered a step increase in filing volume.

Volume growth reflects regulatory pressure, not criminal activity.

Defensive SARs: Banks file reports to protect *themselves*, not to inform regulators.

FinCEN receives more SARs than it can process – the bottleneck shifted from **collection** to **analysis**.

SAR volume quadrupled in 13 years. Detection rate remained at 1–2%. The transparency paradox in one chart.

How Many Transactions Does It Take to Produce One Conviction?



The funnel:

- 100M transactions
- 5M alerts (5%)
- 500K ML high-risk (10%)
- 50K analyst review (10%)
- 5K SARs filed (10%)
- 200 law enforcement (4%)
- 20 prosecutions (10%)
- 5 convictions (25%)

Overall efficiency:

$$\frac{5}{100{,}000{,}000} = 0.000005\%$$

Each funnel stage is an information **filter**. The question is not how much data enters the top – it is how much **signal** exits the bottom.

The AML alert funnel has an overall efficiency of 0.000005%. This is the mathematical anatomy of the transparency paradox.

Building a Rule-Based AML Monitor in Python

```python
import pandas as pd, numpy as np

def rule_based_aml_monitor(transactions_df, rules=None):
    """Flag suspicious transactions using configurable rules."""
    if rules is None:
        rules = {
            'large_amount': 10_000,      # CTR threshold (USD)
            'structuring_window': 24,     # hours
            'structuring_total': 10_000,  # aggregate threshold
            'high_risk_countries': ['MM', 'KP', 'IR', 'SY'],
        }
    alerts = pd.DataFrame()
    # Rule 1: Large single transaction
    mask_large = transactions_df['amount'] >= rules['large_amount']
    # Rule 2: Structuring detection (aggregate within window)
    df = transactions_df.sort_values(['sender_id', 'time'])
    df['rolling_sum'] = df.groupby('sender_id')['amount'].transform(
        lambda x: x.rolling(f"{rules['structuring_window']}h").sum())
    mask_struct = (df['rolling_sum'] >= rules['structuring_total']) & ~mask_large
    # Rule 3: High-risk geography
    mask_geo = transactions_df['receiver_country'].isin(
        rules['high_risk_countries'])
    alerts = transactions_df[mask_large | mask_struct | mask_geo].copy()
    alerts['rule_triggered'] = np.where(mask_large, 'large_amount',
        np.where(mask_struct, 'structuring', 'high_risk_geo'))
    return alerts
```

This naive rule engine generates $\sim$5% alert rate. ML-based systems reduce this to $\sim$0.5% at the same recall.

This 25-line function captures the core logic of legacy AML monitoring. Its false positive rate is why RegTech exists.

Can a 130-Year-Old Math Formula Catch Modern Financial Criminals?



Benford's Law:

$$P(d) = \log_{10}\left(1 + \frac{1}{d}\right), \quad d \in \{1, \ldots, 9\}$$

Expected: d=1: 30.1%, d=2: 17.6%, ..., d=9: 4.6%

Chi-squared test:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{d=1}^{9} \frac{(O_d - E_d)^2}{E_d}$$

Why it works for AML: Criminals structuring transactions below the $10,000 threshold create an unnatural spike in digits 9 and 4 (amounts like $9,500, $4,800).

Benford's Law is a **first-pass anomaly detector**: if a dataset's digit distribution deviates, it warrants investigation.

Benford's Law: no special data needed, no ML model to train, just basic digit counting. Used in tax fraud detection, election monitoring, and AML.

Implementing Benford's Law Analysis in Python

```python
import numpy as np
from scipy import stats

def benfords_analysis(amounts):
    """Test if transaction amounts follow Benford's Law.

    Returns chi-squared statistic, p-value, and digit frequencies.
    """
    # Extract first digit (ignoring zeros and negatives)
    amounts = amounts[amounts > 0]
    first_digits = (amounts / 10 ** np.floor(np.log10(amounts))).astype(int)
    first_digits = first_digits[(first_digits >= 1) & (first_digits <= 9)]

    # Observed frequencies
    observed = np.array([(first_digits == d).sum() for d in range(1, 10)])
    observed_pct = observed / observed.sum() * 100

    # Expected frequencies (Benford's Law)
    expected_pct = np.array([np.log10(1 + 1/d) * 100 for d in range(1, 10)])
    expected = expected_pct / 100 * observed.sum()

    # Chi-squared goodness-of-fit test
    chi2, p_value = stats.chisquare(observed, expected)

    return {
        'chi2': chi2, 'p_value': p_value,
        'observed_pct': observed_pct, 'expected_pct': expected_pct,
        'suspicious': p_value < 0.05 # Reject Benford at 5% level
    }
```

If `suspicious` is True, the digit distribution deviates from Benford's Law – warranting deeper investigation.

This is a screening tool, not a proof of fraud. Benford deviation triggers investigation; it does not replace it.

Why Can't Individual Transaction Monitoring See Corporate Networks?



Graph metrics for suspicious networks:

Degree centrality:

$$C_D(v) = \frac{\deg(v)}{n-1}$$

Betweenness centrality:

$$C_B(v) = \sum_{s \neq v \neq t} \frac{\sigma_{st}(v)}{\sigma_{st}}$$

A shell company with high betweenness sits **between** legitimate and suspicious clusters – it is the **bridge** enabling layering.

Community detection: Louvain algorithm identifies clusters of densely connected entities.

Individual monitoring sees transactions. Network analysis sees **structure**.

Network analysis transforms AML from 'find the suspicious transaction' to 'find the suspicious structure' – a fundamentally different capability.

Building a Shell Company Detection Pipeline in Python

```python
import networkx as nx, numpy as np

def detect_shell_networks(entities_df, transactions_df, threshold=0.7):
    """Identify suspicious entity networks using graph analysis."""
    G = nx.DiGraph()
    # Add nodes with attributes
    for _, row in entities_df.iterrows():
        G.add_node(row['entity_id'], type=row['entity_type'],
                   jurisdiction=row['jurisdiction'])
    # Add weighted edges from transactions
    for _, row in transactions_df.iterrows():
        if G.has_edge(row['sender_id'], row['receiver_id']):
            G[row['sender_id']][row['receiver_id']]['weight'] += row['amount']
        else:
            G.add_edge(row['sender_id'], row['receiver_id'],
                       weight=row['amount'])
    # Compute centrality metrics
    betweenness = nx.betweenness_centrality(G, weight='weight')
    suspicious = {n: b for n, b in betweenness.items()
                  if b > threshold and G.nodes[n].get('type') == 'company'}
    return suspicious, G
```

High-betweenness shell companies are the "middlemen" of money laundering – they bridge legitimate and criminal clusters.

This pipeline finds structural bridges in a financial network. Production systems add temporal analysis, jurisdiction risk scoring, and UBO resolution.

How Can Machines Read 30,000 Pages of Financial Regulation?



TF-IDF:

$$\text{TF-IDF}(t, d) = \text{TF}(t, d) \times \log \frac{N}{|\{d : t \in d\}|}$$

- TF = term frequency (how often a word appears in a document)
- IDF = inverse document frequency (how rare a word is across all documents)
- High TF-IDF = frequent in THIS document but rare across ALL documents

RegTech applications:

- **Change detection:** compare TF-IDF vectors of old vs new regulation
- **Obligation extraction:** identify "shall", "must", "required to" + entities
- **Cross-regulation mapping:** compare vectors across jurisdictions

NLP turns 30,000 pages of regulation into structured, machine-actionable obligations. This is how RegTech firms like Ascent and Cube stay ahead.

Parsing Regulatory Text with TF-IDF in Python

```python
from sklearn.feature_extraction.text import TfidfVectorizer
import pandas as pd

def analyze_regulation(regulation_texts, regulation_names):
    """Extract key terms from regulatory documents using TF-IDF.

    Args:
        regulation_texts: list of document strings
        regulation_names: list of regulation names
    Returns:
        DataFrame of top terms per regulation
    """
    vectorizer = TfidfVectorizer(
        max_features=500, stop_words='english',
        ngram_range=(1, 3), # Capture phrases like "beneficial ownership"
        min_df=1, max_df=0.9)

    tfidf_matrix = vectorizer.fit_transform(regulation_texts)
    feature_names = vectorizer.get_feature_names_out()

    results = {}
    for i, name in enumerate(regulation_names):
        row = tfidf_matrix[i].toarray().flatten()
        top_indices = row.argsort()[-15:][::-1]
        results[name] = [(feature_names[j], round(row[j], 3))
                         for j in top_indices]
    return results
```

TF-IDF is the simplest NLP approach. Production systems use BERT-based models for semantic understanding and obligation extraction.

This function identifies the distinguishing terms in each regulation – the starting point for automated compliance mapping.

When the Model Says 80% Risk, How Often Is It Actually Right?



Calibration: Well-calibrated if $P(Y{=}1 \mid \hat{p} = p) = p$ for all p.
Brier score: $\text{BS} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(\hat{p}_i - y_i)^2$
Decomposition: BS = Rel. − Res. + Unc.

- Reliability = calibration error
- Resolution = separation power
- Uncertainty = base rate (fixed)

Why it matters: A risk score of 0.8 should mean 80% of entities scored 0.8 are truly suspicious. If it means 40%, analysts waste time on false leads.

AUC measures ranking ability. Calibration measures probability accuracy. A compliance system needs both.

Is RegTech a Trend or a Structural Transformation?



Market growth: $6B (2018) to projected $33B (2028), CAGR 22.3%.

Growth drivers:

- Regulatory expansion (EU AI Act, DORA)
- Digital transformation mandates
- Fines as motivation ($50B+ since 2012)

Segment analysis:

- **Identity/KYC:** Largest segment, driven by digital onboarding
- **AML/CFT:** Fastest growing, driven by ML adoption
- **Reporting:** Steady, driven by data standards (XBRL, ISO 20022)

RegTech is not a cyclical trend – it is a **structural response** to the irreversible expansion of regulation.

A $33B market by 2028. Every new regulation is a growth driver for RegTech – the irony of the transparency paradox.

Are Regulators Practicing What They Preach About Technology?



Based on BIS/FSI surveys 2023-2024

Adoption highlights:

- Highest: Data collection (78%) – regulators automate intake first
- Lowest: Climate risk (18%) – newest frontier

The gap between collection (78%) and risk scoring (52%) suggests regulators **collect more data than they can analyze** – the transparency paradox on the regulator's side.

Key examples:

- ECB: Suptech Prototype Lab for automated data quality checks
- MAS (Singapore): COSMIC platform, API-based regulatory reporting
- Bank of England: ML for stress test submission analysis

Regulators face the same transparency paradox as banks: collecting data is easy, analyzing it is hard. SupTech adoption is uneven.

Is It Cheaper to Comply or to Pay the Fine?



For most banks: compliance cost $>$ penalties (compliance is "insurance").

For some banks (HSBC, Danske Bank): penalties **exceeded** annual compliance spend – compliance investment was insufficient.

Economic framework:

$$E[\text{Penalty}] = P(\text{caught}) \times \text{Fine}$$

If $P(\text{caught}) \times \text{Fine} > C_{\text{comply}}$, compliance is rational.

For **small violations**, under-compliance is economically rational but legally and ethically unacceptable.

Regulators counter this by making fines **unpredictable** and potentially existential.

The rational bank invests in compliance up to the expected penalty. The problem: penalties are unpredictable. HSBC's $1.9B fine was not in any risk model.

How Do You Model Customer Risk as a Bayesian Inference Problem?

KYC as Bayesian Inference

Prior: $P(\text{high-risk})$ based on customer category (PEP, jurisdiction, business type).
Evidence: $\mathbf{e}$ = (ID verification, source of wealth, transaction history, adverse media)

Posterior:

$$P(\text{high-risk} \mid \mathbf{e}) = \frac{P(\mathbf{e} \mid \text{high-risk}) \cdot P(\text{high-risk})}{P(\mathbf{e})}$$

Naive Bayes approximation (assuming conditional independence of evidence):

$$P(\text{high-risk} \mid \mathbf{e}) \propto P(\text{high-risk}) \prod_{j=1}^{k} P(e_j \mid \text{high-risk})$$

Risk scoring (sigmoid):

$$\text{Risk Score} = \sigma\left(\sum_{j=1}^{k} w_j \cdot f(e_j) + b\right), \quad \sigma(z) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-z}}$$

Customer Category	Prior P(high-risk)	Evidence Weight	Example
Standard retail	0.01	Low	Domestic salary account
High-net-worth	0.05	Medium	Source of wealth scrutiny
PEP (Politically Exposed)	0.15	High	Enhanced due diligence
High-risk jurisdiction	0.10	High	FATF grey/blacklist country

The KYC process is formally a **sequential Bayesian update**: each new piece of evidence updates the customer's risk posterior.

KYC is Bayesian inference in disguise. Each document the bank collects is an evidence update on the customer's risk posterior.

How Does an ML Model Decide What Looks 'Abnormal'?

Isolation Forest
Key idea: anomalies are "few and different" – they require fewer splits to isolate.

Anomaly score:

$$s(x, n) = 2^{-\frac{E[h(x)]}{c(n)}}$$

where $h(x)$ = path length, $c(n)$ = normalization.

- $s \approx 1$: definite anomaly
- $s \approx 0.5$: normal point
- $s < 0.5$: very normal (deep in the tree)

Autoencoder Approach
Train a neural network to reconstruct normal transaction patterns.

Reconstruction error:

$$\text{MSE} = \frac{1}{d}\sum_{i=1}^{d}(x_i - \hat{x}_i)^2$$

High reconstruction error = pattern the model has **not seen before** = anomalous.

Key advantage: Both approaches learn "normal" from data and flag deviations. Neither requires labeled examples of fraud – critical because labeled AML data is rare.

Unsupervised anomaly detection is the workhorse of modern AML – it learns what 'normal' looks like and flags everything that does not fit.

What Language Do Machines Use to Talk to Regulators?

Standard	Purpose	Format	Coverage
XBRL	Financial reporting	XML-based taxonomy	SEC (US), ESMA (EU), global
ISO 20022	Payment messaging	XML/JSON schemas	SWIFT migration 2022–2025
LEI	Entity identification	20-char alphanumeric	2.3M+ entities registered
ISIN	Security identification	12-char alphanumeric	All traded securities
FpML	OTC derivatives	XML-based	Global derivatives market
CDM	Trade lifecycle	JSON / code-as-data	ISDA initiative

The convergence toward **machine-readable standards** is the infrastructure layer of RegTech. Without standards, automation is impossible.

Key trend: The ISO 20022 migration (2022–2025) creates a universal transaction language that enables **cross-border AML analytics**. Richer data fields (structured remittance information, LEI references) allow ML models to extract features that were previously buried in unstructured free-text fields.

CDM (Common Domain Model): ISDA's initiative to represent the entire trade lifecycle as executable code – moving from "documents that describe processes" to "code that IS the process."

Data standards are the unglamorous foundation of RegTech – without them, the entire intelligent compliance stack falls apart.

Why Is the EU Now Regulating Banks' Cloud Providers?

DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act, effective January 2025)

Scope: ALL EU financial entities – banks, insurers, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers.

Five pillars:

1. **ICT risk management framework** – mandatory for all entities
2. **ICT incident reporting** – major incidents reported within 4 hours
3. **Digital operational resilience testing** – threat-led penetration testing for large firms
4. **Third-party risk management** – cloud providers and RegTech vendors treated as critical third parties
5. **Information-sharing arrangements** – cross-institution threat intelligence

DORA extends regulation from **what** banks do to **how** they do it technologically.

For RegTech: DORA means the compliance system itself must be compliant – a **meta-compliance** requirement.

Transparency paradox connection: DORA adds another layer of reporting. The question is whether this layer adds insight or just noise.

DORA is the first regulation that treats technology infrastructure as a systemic risk – your cloud provider is now a compliance concern.

Generating Regulatory Reports Programmatically

```python
import json
from datetime import datetime

def generate_sar_report(alert, investigation, analyst_id):
    """Generate a machine-readable SAR report from investigation data."""
    report = {
        'report_type': 'SAR',
        'filing_date': datetime.now().isoformat(),
        'analyst_id': analyst_id,
        'subject': {
            'entity_id': alert['entity_id'],
            'entity_name': alert.get('entity_name', 'UNKNOWN'),
            'risk_score': alert['risk_score'],
        },
        'suspicious_activity': {
            'type': investigation['activity_type'],
            'amount_total': sum(t['amount'] for t in alert['transactions']),
            'date_range': {
                'start': min(t['date'] for t in alert['transactions']),
                'end': max(t['date'] for t in alert['transactions']),
            },
            'narrative': investigation['narrative'],
        },
        'ml_evidence': {
            'model_version': alert.get('model_version', 'v1.0'),
            'anomaly_score': alert.get('anomaly_score'),
            'network_risk': alert.get('network_risk'),
        },
    }
    return report
```

Machine-readable SARs enable regulators to aggregate and analyze reports at scale – closing the loop on the transparency paradox.

What Does the EU AI Act Mean for Your AML Model?

AI Act Requirement	Impact on Compliance AI	Implementation
High-risk classification	Credit scoring AND AML classified high-risk	Conformity assessment before deployment
Explainability	Must explain WHY a transaction was flagged	SHAP values, feature importance reports
Human oversight	Human-in-the-loop for consequential decisions	Cannot fully automate SAR filing
Bias testing	Must test for discrimination across groups	Fairness audit across nationality, geography
Data governance	Training data must be documented, auditable	Data lineage, quality metrics, provenance
Robustness testing	Must test against adversarial attacks	Red-teaming: can criminals fool the model?

The AI Act does **not** prohibit ML in compliance. It requires that compliance AI be **transparent, auditable, fair, and human-supervised**.

For RegTech firms: this is **both** a cost (conformity assessment) and an opportunity (differentiation through compliance with the AI Act itself).

Timeline: High-risk AI systems must comply by August 2026. Financial institutions deploying AML or credit scoring models must have conformity assessments, technical documentation, and human oversight mechanisms in place.

The EU AI Act applies to compliance AI itself – creating a meta-compliance layer: the compliance system must comply with AI regulation.

What Happens When the Compliance Model Itself Is Wrong?

Model risk management (SR 11-7 / FINMA 2008/21):

- **Tier 1:** Model validation – independent team tests model before deployment
- **Tier 2:** Ongoing monitoring – track performance metrics over time
- **Tier 3:** Model inventory – all models documented with owner, purpose, last validation date

Key metrics to monitor:

- AUC over time (should not degrade >5% from baseline)
- False positive rate trend (should decrease or stay flat)
- Alert-to-SAR conversion rate (should increase)

Population Stability Index (PSI):

$$\text{PSI} = \sum_i (A_i - E_i) \cdot \ln \frac{A_i}{E_i}$$

- PSI < 0.1: no action needed
- PSI 0.1–0.25: investigate drift
- PSI > 0.25: retrain the model



IF PSI > 0.25
OR AUC drops $> 5\%$
$\Rightarrow$ RETRAIN

A model deployed and forgotten is a ticking bomb. The lifecycle is **continuous**.

Model risk management is the compliance of compliance – ensuring the tools you rely on are themselves reliable.

Should Your Bank Build Its Own RegTech or Buy Off-the-Shelf?

Dimension	Build In-House	Buy from Vendor	Hybrid
Upfront cost	High ($10M+)	Medium ($1–3M/yr)	Medium ($5M + $500K/yr)
Time to deploy	18–24 months	3–6 months	9–12 months
Customization	Full	Limited	Moderate
Data sovereignty	Full control	Vendor access	Controlled sharing
Vendor lock-in	None	High	Medium
Regulatory approval	Easier (own model)	Harder (black box)	Middle ground
Talent requirement	Large ML team	Small integration team	ML team + vendor support
Best for	Tier 1 banks ($100B+)	Small/medium banks	Large regional banks

Decision tree: (1) Do you have ML talent? (2) Is data sovereignty critical? (3) Is your compliance use case standard or unique?

Swiss examples:

- **NetGuardians** – AI-powered fraud detection (Yverdon-les-Bains)
- **Apiax** – Regulatory content as a service (Zurich)
- **SIX Group** – Data infrastructure and regulatory services (Zurich)

There is no universally correct answer. The choice depends on scale, talent, data sensitivity, and regulatory posture.

Is Compliance Moving Toward Continuous Monitoring or Just Continuous Reporting?

Era	Model	Technology	Bottleneck
Pre-2008	Self-regulation	Excel, manual	Trust
2008–2015	Rules explosion	Rule engines	Cost
2015–2022	RegTech 1.0	ML, RPA	Integration
2022–2028	RegTech 2.0	Graph, NLP, AI	Explainability
2028+	Continuous	Real-time APIs	Trust (in algo.)

Key insight:

The arc of compliance bends from **periodic reporting** to **continuous monitoring**.

But continuous monitoring only works if the system generates **intelligence**, not just data.

The transparency paradox resolves when both sides (banks and regulators) move from volume-based to intelligence-based compliance simultaneously.

The future is not more data. It is **better signal**.

The future is continuous, intelligence-driven compliance. The paradox resolves when both banks and regulators optimize for outcomes, not outputs.

Key Takeaways

1. The regulator-bank relationship is a **principal-agent monitoring problem**. Compliance is the signal banks send to reduce information asymmetry – but signals can be honest or strategic.
2. Rule-based AML monitoring generates **95%+ false positives**. ML-based systems reduce this to 40–60%, but introduce model risk, bias, and explainability challenges.
3. **Benford's Law, network analysis, and NLP** are three complementary RegTech tools attacking different aspects: transaction manipulation, corporate structures, and regulatory interpretation.
4. The AML alert funnel has an efficiency of **0.000005%** (5 convictions per 100M transactions). Optimizing each stage is more productive than adding more data at the top.
5. The EU AI Act and DORA create a **meta-compliance requirement**: the compliance system itself must be compliant, explainable, fair, and resilient.
6. The transparency paradox resolves when compliance shifts from **volume** (more reports, more data, more alerts) to **intelligence** (better signals, better context, better decisions).

Next: Lesson 05 – Blockchain Fundamentals. A technology that proposes to solve the transparency problem by making all transactions visible by design.



The goal was never to see everything. It was to see what matters.

From surveillance telescope to AI magnifying glass – the transformation from volume to intelligence.