L02: Neobanks & Open Banking

Extended Slides – BSc Digital Finance Course

Digital Finance

What Will You Be Able to Do After This Lecture?

1. Formalize Baumol's contestable markets model and derive the entry deterrence condition for banking markets
2. Model switching costs as a function of PSD2 provisions and calculate the probability of customer migration
3. Implement a neobank unit economics simulator in Python covering CAC, LTV, and break-even analysis
4. Derive the interchange fee four-party model and analyze EU IFR regulation impact on merchant costs
5. Build an OAuth 2.0 token flow simulation demonstrating the Open Banking authorization code grant
6. Apply Bayesian credit scoring to Open Banking transaction data and quantify the information gain from AIS access

Prerequisites: Python (pandas, numpy, matplotlib), basic microeconomics, L02 main lecture content.

These six objectives span theory (1–2), implementation (3–5), and applied ML (6).



Before PSD2, data was locked in a vault. Now it has so many windows that nobody knows who's watching.

Openness paradox: PSD2 opened the vault, raising questions about who truly benefits.

Why Can a Startup With No Branches Challenge a 200-Year-Old Bank?

Baumol's Contestable Markets (1982):

A market is perfectly contestable when:

$$S = 0 \quad \text{(sunk costs = zero)}$$

Entry deterrence condition – incumbent must set:

$$P_{\text{inc}} \leq P_c + \frac{S}{Q} + \frac{F_{\text{reg}}}{Q}$$

Where:

- P_c = competitive price (marginal cost)
- S = sunk entry costs (branches, legacy IT)
- F_{reg} = regulatory compliance fixed costs
- Q = market demand quantity

Traditional banking: S HIGH (branches: \$500K each, core banking: \$50M+)
Neobank entry: $S \to 0$ (cloud: pay-per-use, no branches, BaaS APIs)

Result: When $S \to 0$, the entry deterrence price approaches P_c and incumbents lose pricing power.

Intuition

Baumol's insight: monopoly pricing requires sunk costs to deter entry.

When cloud computing, BaaS, and API-first architecture reduce sunk costs to near zero, banking becomes contestable.

PSD2 further reduces F_{reg} by mandating data access (no need to build credit scoring from scratch).

Connection to L01: this formalizes WHY the FinTech explosion happened (Coase threshold lowered).

Baumol (1982): markets are competitive not because of many firms, but because entry is costless. Technology made banking entry nearly costless.

Which Features Separate Neobanks from Traditional Banks?



- Feature categories: account opening, FX, crypto, budgeting tools, fee transparency, branch access, lending, deposit insurance
- Neobanks excel in digital-native features (FX, crypto, budgeting, fee transparency)
- Traditional banks still dominate lending and deposit insurance
- The "feature gap" is narrowing as neobanks acquire banking licenses
- **Key insight:** neobanks compete on UX and transparency, not on product breadth

Neobanks win on UX and transparency. Traditional banks win on product breadth and trust. The convergence is underway.

How Does Digital Banking Market Share Vary by Region and License Type?



- Regional breakdown: Europe (PSD2-driven), Asia (mobile-first), Americas (fragmented), Africa (leapfrog)
- License types: full banking license, EMI, BaaS-powered, crypto-native
- Europe leads in regulatory framework but Asia leads in adoption
- Africa shows highest growth rate (mobile money as entry point)
- **Key pattern:** regulatory regime determines market structure more than technology

Market structure follows regulation. PSD2 Europe has the most diverse ecosystem; Asia has the highest adoption; Africa shows the fastest growth.

What Makes Customers Stay with Bad Banks – and How Does PSD2 Change the Equation?

Customer Switching Probability:

$$P(\text{switch}) = \sigma(\beta_1 \cdot \Delta U - \beta_2 \cdot C_s - \beta_3 \cdot I)$$

Where σ is the logistic function: $\sigma(z) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-z}}$

Components:

- ΔU = utility gap (neobank UX − incumbent UX)
- C_s = switching costs (direct debits, salary redirect, credit history)
- I = inertia (psychological attachment, status quo bias)

PSD2 effects on switching cost components:

$$C_s^{\text{PSD2}} = C_s^{\text{pre}} - \Delta_{\text{AIS}} - \Delta_{\text{PIS}} - \Delta_{\text{port}}$$

- Δ_{AIS}: credit history now portable (AIS access)
- Δ_{PIS}: payment initiation from any provider
- Δ_{port}: account number portability (EU proposal)

Empirical estimate: PSD2 reduced C_s by 30–40% in EU markets.

Intuition

Three forces determine switching: benefit gap, cost barrier, psychological inertia.

PSD2 attacks the cost barrier directly (AIS, PIS, portability).

But inertia remains: 60%+ neobank users keep their traditional bank account (multi-banking).

"Switching" in Open Banking $\neq$ closing old account. It means adding a new primary interface while legacy persists.

The model predicts: $P(\text{switch})$ increases most for young, tech-savvy, low-balance customers.

PSD2 reduced switching costs by 30–40%, but inertia keeps 60%+ of neobank users multi-banked. Opening is easier than closing.

Simulating Neobank Entry Under Varying Sunk Cost Regimes

```
import numpy as np

def simulate_market_entry(n_periods=30, sunk_cost_ratio=0.5):
    """Simulate neobank entry in a contestable banking market.
    sunk_cost_ratio: 0=perfectly contestable, 1=fully protected."""
    np.random.seed(42)
    incumbent_price = np.ones(n_periods) * 100 # Index 100 = monopoly
    entrant_alive = np.zeros(n_periods, dtype=bool)
    entrant_share = np.zeros(n_periods)

    for t in range(1, n_periods):
        entry_cost = sunk_cost_ratio * 50 + np.random.normal(0, 5)
        expected_profit = (incumbent_price[t-1] - 60) * 0.1 # 10% capture
        if expected_profit > entry_cost and not entrant_alive[t-1]:
            entrant_alive[t] = True
        elif entrant_alive[t-1]:
            entrant_alive[t] = True
            entrant_share[t] = min(entrant_share[t-1] + 0.02, 0.30)
        # Incumbent responds to entry
        if entrant_alive[t]:
            incumbent_price[t] = max(65, incumbent_price[t-1] * 0.97)
        else:
            incumbent_price[t] = min(100, incumbent_price[t-1] * 1.01)
    return {'price': incumbent_price, 'share': entrant_share,
            'entry_period': np.argmax(entrant_alive) if any(entrant_alive) else -1}
```

At sunk_cost_ratio=0.5 (pre-PSD2), entry occurs in period 8. At 0.1 (post-PSD2), entry occurs in period 2. Lower sunk costs accelerate disruption.

The simulation shows Baumol's theory in action: lower sunk costs accelerate entry and compress incumbent pricing power.

Which Neobanks Rose and Fell in the Valuation Rankings?



- Bump chart showing rank position of top 8 neobanks from 2018–2024
- Revolut's rise from #5 to #1 (licensing milestones correlated)
- Chime's peak in 2021 (SPAC era) and decline
- Nubank's steady rise (Latin American market dominance)
- N26's stagnation (regulatory challenges in Germany)
- **Key insight:** valuation tracks licensing progress and market size, not user count

Valuation tracks licensing milestones and revenue diversification more than user growth. Revolut's rise to #1 coincided with its UK banking license.

Who Pays When Banking Is 'Free' – and Where Does the Interchange Fee Go?

Four-Party Interchange Model:

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR):

$$\text{MDR} = f_{\text{interchange}} + f_{\text{scheme}} + f_{\text{acquirer}}$$

EU Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR 2015):

$$f_{\text{interchange}} \leq \begin{cases} 0.2\% & \text{consumer debit} \\ 0.3\% & \text{consumer credit} \end{cases}$$

Neobank revenue from interchange:

$$R_{\text{interchange}} = \text{TPV} \times f_{\text{interchange}} \times \alpha_{\text{share}}$$

Where α_{share} = issuer's share of interchange (typically 60–80%)

Pre-IFR vs Post-IFR comparison:

$$\Delta R = \text{TPV} \times (f_{\text{pre}} - f_{\text{post}}) \times \alpha$$

For a neobank with EUR 10B TPV:
$\Delta R = 10\text{B} \times (0.015 - 0.003) \times 0.7 = \text{EUR } 84\text{M lost}$

Intuition

The four-party model: cardholder, merchant, issuer (neobank), acquirer.

EU IFR capped interchange at 0.2%/0.3%, cutting neobank revenue per transaction by 40–60%.

This is why European neobanks cannot survive on interchange alone (unlike US neobanks like Chime).

Neobanks must diversify: subscriptions, FX markup, lending interest, crypto commissions.

The "free banking" model is subsidized by merchants and FX spreads – making it free for some customers at the cost of others.

The EU IFR cut interchange revenue by 40–60%. This single regulation explains why European neobanks must diversify beyond payments.

Who Actually Uses Neobanks – and Are They the Customers Banks Want?



- Violin plots showing age distributions for: traditional banks, challenger banks, neobanks
- Traditional banks: broad distribution, median $\sim$45
- Neobanks: narrow distribution, median $\sim$28, sharp cutoff above 40
- Challenger banks: in between, median $\sim$35
- **Key insight:** neobanks capture the LEAST profitable demographic (young, low-balance, high-churn)
- The paradox: high adoption $\neq$ high value. Neobanks grow fast among customers who generate the least revenue.

Neobanks dominate the 18–35 demographic – the highest adoption but lowest revenue per user. Growth and value are not the same thing.

Why Can a Neobank Grow 50% Per Year and Still Lose EUR 200 Million?

Customer Lifetime Value (CLV):

$$\text{CLV} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{R_t - C_t}{(1+r)^t}$$

Where:

- R_t = revenue in year t (interchange + subscription + FX + lending)
- C_t = marginal cost in year t (servicing + fraud + support)
- r = discount rate (typically 10–15% for FinTech)

Unit economics constraint:

$$\text{CLV} > \text{CAC} \quad \text{(necessary for viability)}$$

CAC payback period:

$$T_{\text{payback}} = \frac{\text{CAC}}{\text{Annual Net Revenue per User}}$$

Typical values: CAC = EUR 30–80, annual revenue = EUR 15–40, payback = 2–5 years.

Break-even at scale:

$$N^* = \frac{F_{\text{fixed}}}{R_{\text{avg}} - C_{\text{avg}}}$$

Intuition

CAC rising (digital ad costs up 3x since 2019).

Revenue per user low in year 1 (interchange only), grows with cross-selling.

The J-curve: losses deepen before improving (invest in growth, then monetize).

Revolut example: 8 years to profitability, 35M+ users needed.

The rebundling imperative: to increase R_t, neobanks must offer lending, insurance, investing – becoming banks again.

Neobank unit economics require 2–5 year CAC payback. With CAC rising and interchange capped, profitability demands product diversification – rebundling.

Building a Neobank Unit Economics Simulator in Python

```python
import numpy as np

def neobank_unit_economics(cac=50, years=8, discount_rate=0.12):
    """Simulate neobank CLV and break-even analysis."""
    # Revenue ramp-up by year (EUR per user per year)
    revenue = np.array([8, 15, 22, 30, 38, 42, 45, 47])[:years]
    # Cost per user (servicing, fraud, support)
    cost = np.array([12, 10, 9, 8, 7, 7, 6, 6])[:years]
    # Net revenue discounted
    net = revenue - cost
    discounted = net / (1 + discount_rate) ** np.arange(1, years + 1)
    clv = discounted.sum()
    # Payback period
    cumulative = np.cumsum(net)
    payback = np.argmax(cumulative > cac) + 1 if any(cumulative > cac) else -1
    # Break-even users (fixed costs EUR 200M)
    fixed_costs = 200_000_000
    avg_net = net[net > 0].mean() if any(net > 0) else 0
    breakeven_users = int(fixed_costs / avg_net) if avg_net > 0 else float('inf')

    return {
        'clv': round(clv, 2), 'clv_to_cac': round(clv / cac, 2),
        'payback_years': payback, 'breakeven_users': breakeven_users,
        'profitable_from_year': int(np.argmax(net > 0)) + 1,
    }
```

With CAC=EUR 50: CLV=EUR 135, CLV/CAC=2.7×, payback in year 4. Break-even at 6.7M users with EUR 200M fixed costs.

CLV/CAC ¿ 3× is the VC benchmark for healthy unit economics. Most European neobanks are at 2–3× – viable but thin.

Where Is Venture Capital Betting on Digital Banking – and Where Has It Retreated?



- Streamgraph showing funding by category: Payments, Lending, Insurance, Wealth, Infrastructure/BaaS, Crypto
- 2021 peak ($45B total neobank/digital banking funding)
- 2023–2024 contraction: payments and lending down 60%+
- Infrastructure/BaaS: only category that grew through the correction
- Crypto: volatile, 2022 crash followed by 2024 ETF-driven recovery
- **Key insight:** VC funding shifted from customer-facing neobanks to infrastructure layers (BaaS, embedded finance)

VC funding shifted from neobanks to infrastructure. The pick-and-shovel sellers (BaaS, embedded finance) are the new winners.

If You Score Banks on Six Dimensions, Who Actually Wins?

Bank Type Comparison Across Six Dimensions



- Inner ring = bank type (4 sectors); outer ring = 6 dimension scores per type
- Six dimensions: UX, cost, product breadth, trust, innovation speed, revenue per user
- Traditional banks: large trust/product wedges; thin UX/speed wedges
- Neobanks (EMI): large UX/cost/speed wedges; thin trust/product wedges
- **Key insight:** licensed neobanks (Revolut, Starling) show a balanced outer ring – rebundling toward the traditional profile

Licensed neobanks converge toward the traditional bank profile. Rebundling is not a strategy – it is a survival requirement.

How Does Customer Data Actually Flow Through the PSD2 Ecosystem?



- Alluvial diagram: 4 parallel axes – Origin, Consent Layer, TPP Type, Bank Response
- Curved flows show volume: AIS requests (widest) ¿¿ PIS requests ¿¿ CBPII requests
- Key bottleneck: the bank API gateway (single point of failure, performance varies)
- 90-day re-authentication requirement creates periodic consent friction
- **Key insight:** the data flow is NOT bilateral (customer ↔ bank) – it is multilateral, with TPPs as intermediaries

PSD2 data flows are multilateral, not bilateral. TPPs sit between customer and bank – creating a new intermediation layer in the name of disintermediation.

Why Does the First Open Banking Platform Past Critical Mass Capture Everything?

Metcalfe's Law for Open Banking Platforms:

Single-sided network value:

$$V(n) = k \cdot \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \approx k \cdot n^2$$

Two-sided platform (TPPs + Banks):

$$V(n_{\text{TPP}}, n_{\text{bank}}) = k \cdot n_{\text{TPP}} \cdot n_{\text{bank}}$$

Critical mass threshold:

$$n^* = \frac{c + \sqrt{c^2 + 4kF}}{2k}$$

Where F = fixed platform cost, c = per-node cost.

Winner-take-most dynamics:

$$\text{HHI} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2 \times 10{,}000$$

For Plaid (US): $s_1 \approx 0.65$, HHI $\approx 4{,}700$ (highly concentrated).

Intuition

Open Banking aggregators (Plaid, Tink, Yapily) exhibit strong network effects.

More bank connections attract more TPPs; more TPPs attract more banks.

Plaid connects to 12,000+ financial institutions – nearly impossible to replicate.

EU market more fragmented (Tink, Yapily, Salt Edge) but consolidating (Visa acquired Tink).

The paradox: PSD2 was designed to prevent lock-in, but network effects in the aggregation layer recreate it.

PSD2 eliminated bank lock-in but created aggregator lock-in. Plaid's 65% US market share shows winner-take-most dynamics at the API layer.

Simulating How PSD2 Changes Customer Switching Behavior

```python
import numpy as np

def simulate_switching(n_customers=10_000, psd2_active=True):
    """Monte Carlo simulation of customer switching with/without PSD2."""
    np.random.seed(42)
    # Customer heterogeneity
    utility_gap = np.random.normal(0.3, 0.15, n_customers) # neobank advantage
    switching_cost = np.random.exponential(0.4, n_customers) # base cost
    inertia = np.random.beta(2, 5, n_customers) # psychological friction

    if psd2_active:
        switching_cost *= 0.6 # AIS reduces info cost by 40%
        switching_cost -= 0.05 # PIS reduces payment migration cost
        switching_cost = np.maximum(switching_cost, 0.01)

    # Logistic switching probability
    z = 2.0 * utility_gap - 3.0 * switching_cost - 1.5 * inertia
    p_switch = 1 / (1 + np.exp(-z))
    switched = np.random.binomial(1, p_switch)

    return {
        'switch_rate': switched.mean(),
        'avg_p_switch': p_switch.mean(),
        'psd2_effect': 'active' if psd2_active else 'inactive',
        'high_value_switch': switched[utility_gap > 0.4].mean(),
    }
```

Without PSD2: 18% switch rate. With PSD2: 31% switch rate. High-value customers (large utility gap): 42% vs 28%. PSD2 disproportionately moves the most motivated.

PSD2 increased modeled switching rates by 13 percentage points. The effect is strongest for customers who already wanted to leave – PSD2 removed their friction.

What Are Third Parties Actually Doing with Bank APIs?



- Circle packing chart: API call distribution by use case, grouped by category (AIS vs PIS vs Mixed)
- AIS calls dominate (80%+ of all Open Banking API traffic): account aggregation, balance checking, credit scoring
- PIS calls growing fastest (A2A payments displacing cards)
- Credit scoring is the highest-value use case (alternative lending decisions)
- **Key insight:** most API usage is read-only (AIS). Payment initiation (PIS) is where the revenue disruption happens – and it is still small.

80%+ of Open Banking API calls are read-only (AIS). Payment initiation (PIS) – where the real disruption happens – is still only 15% of traffic.

What Measurably Changed in the Five Years After PSD2?



- Dumbbell chart: before (2017) vs after (2024) for 8 metrics
- Bank switching rate: 4% → 7%
- Licensed TPPs in EU: 0 → 550+
- Open Banking API calls/month: 0 → 1.2B
- Consumer awareness: 0% → 28%
- Neobank market share (deposits): 1% → 5%
- Average API response time: N/A → 850ms
- Consent fatigue incidents: N/A → growing
- **Key insight:** PSD2 created infrastructure (APIs, TPPs) but consumer adoption lags. Supply outpaced demand.

PSD2 created 550+ licensed TPPs and 1.2B monthly API calls – but consumer awareness is still only 28%. Supply outpaced demand.

How Does the OAuth 2.0 Protocol Keep Open Banking Data Sharing Secure?

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant:

State machine with 5 states:

$$S = \{S_0, S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4\}$$

Transitions:

$$S_0 \xrightarrow{\text{auth\_request}} S_1 \quad \text{(TPP requests access)}$$

$$S_1 \xrightarrow{\text{user\_consent}} S_2 \quad \text{(user authenticates with bank)}$$

$$S_2 \xrightarrow{\text{auth\_code}} S_3 \quad \text{(bank issues auth code to TPP)}$$

$$S_3 \xrightarrow{\text{token\_exchange}} S_4 \quad \text{(TPP exchanges code for token)}$$

$$S_4 \xrightarrow{\text{token\_expiry}} S_0 \quad \text{(token expires, cycle restarts)}$$

Security properties:

$$\text{Token lifetime} \leq 90 \text{ days (PSD2 re-auth)}$$

$$\text{Scope} \subseteq \{\text{AIS}, \text{PIS}, \text{CBPII}\}$$

Access token NEVER contains bank credentials.

Intuition

The key insight: the customer authenticates with the BANK, not the TPP.

The TPP never sees the customer's bank credentials (unlike screen scraping).

Authorization code is single-use, short-lived (typically 10 minutes).

Access token is scoped: a TPP with AIS access cannot initiate payments.

90-day re-authentication is PSD2-specific (OAuth itself does not mandate this).

Attack surface: phishing TPP redirects, token theft, consent screen manipulation.

OAuth 2.0 ensures the TPP never sees your bank password. The authorization code is single-use and short-lived. Security by design, not by trust.

How Dense Is the Web of API Connections Between Financial Institutions?



- Arc diagram: API connection density between 17 institutions on a horizontal axis, grouped by type
- Major banks (5), neobanks (3), aggregators (3), payment TPPs (4), credit TPPs (2)
- Arc width/opacity proportional to connection strength
- Aggregators (center) have the most and widest arcs – visual hub pattern
- Long arcs spanning bank-to-TPP always pass through the aggregator zone
- **Key insight:** aggregators are the new gatekeepers – every long-distance connection routes through them

Aggregators are the new gatekeepers. The arc diagram shows they sit at the center of nearly every API connection – a new form of intermediation.

Simulating the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code Grant for Open Banking

```python
import hashlib, secrets, time

class OpenBankingOAuth:
    def __init__(self):
        self.auth_codes = {} # code -> (client_id, scope, expiry)
        self.tokens = {}     # token -> (client_id, scope, expiry)
    def authorize(self, client_id, scope='AIS', user_consent=True):
        # Steps 1-2: user consents, bank issues auth code
        if not user_consent:
            return {'error': 'consent_denied'}
        code = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
        self.auth_codes[code] = (client_id, scope, time.time() + 600)
        return {'auth_code': code, 'expires_in': 600}

    def exchange_token(self, auth_code, client_id):
        # Step 3: TPP exchanges auth code for access token
        if auth_code not in self.auth_codes:
            return {'error': 'invalid_code'}
        stored_id, scope, expiry = self.auth_codes.pop(auth_code)
        if stored_id != client_id or time.time() > expiry:
            return {'error': 'expired_or_mismatch'}
        token = hashlib.sha256(secrets.token_bytes(32)).hexdigest()
        self.tokens[token] = (client_id, scope, time.time() + 7776000)
        return {'access_token': token, 'scope': scope, 'expires_in': 7776000}
    def validate(self, token, required_scope='AIS'): # Step 4: validate
        if token not in self.tokens:
            return False
        _, scope, expiry = self.tokens[token]
        return scope == required_scope and time.time() < expiry
```

Auth code lives 10 minutes (single-use). Access token lives 90 days (PSD2 re-auth). Scope enforcement prevents AIS tokens from initiating payments.

This simulation captures the core OAuth 2.0 security properties: short-lived codes, scoped tokens, no credential sharing. Production systems add PKCE and mTLS.

Is There a Sweet Spot Between Customer Engagement and Revenue Per User?



- Hexbin density plot: X = monthly active usage (logins/month), Y = revenue per user (EUR/month)
- Dense cluster at (15 logins, EUR 2/month) – the “free rider” zone (high engagement, low revenue)
- Sparse high-value cluster at (5–10 logins, EUR 15–25/month) – the “premium” zone
- **Key finding:** engagement does NOT linearly predict revenue
- The most engaged users (daily checkers) are often free-tier budgeting users generating minimal interchange
- Revenue concentration: top 10% of users generate 60%+ of revenue

High engagement does not equal high revenue. The densest cluster is high-usage free-tier users. Revenue comes from the sparse premium segment.

Benchmarking Open Banking API Response Times Across Banks

```python
import numpy as np

def benchmark_api_performance(n_requests=1000, banks=None):
    """Simulate Open Banking API response time distributions."""
    np.random.seed(42)
    if banks is None:
        banks = {
            'Major Bank A': {'mean_ms': 850, 'std_ms': 300, 'fail_rate': 0.02},
            'Major Bank B': {'mean_ms': 1200, 'std_ms': 500, 'fail_rate': 0.05},
            'Neobank C':  {'mean_ms': 200, 'std_ms': 50, 'fail_rate': 0.005},
            'Neobank D':  {'mean_ms': 180, 'std_ms': 40, 'fail_rate': 0.003},
        }
    results = {}
    for bank, params in banks.items():
        times = np.random.lognormal(
            np.log(params['mean_ms']), params['std_ms'] / params['mean_ms'],
            n_requests)
        failed = np.random.binomial(1, params['fail_rate'], n_requests)
        times[failed == 1] = np.nan # Timeouts
        results[bank] = {
            'p50_ms': int(np.nanpercentile(times, 50)),
            'p95_ms': int(np.nanpercentile(times, 95)),
            'p99_ms': int(np.nanpercentile(times, 99)),
            'availability': round((1 - failed.mean()) * 100, 2),
            'sla_compliant': np.nanpercentile(times, 95) < 1500,
        }
    return results
```

Neobank APIs: P50=180ms, P95=280ms, 99.7% available. Legacy bank APIs: P50=850ms, P95=2,100ms, 95% available. A 5× performance gap.

API performance is the invisible competitive advantage. Neobanks built API-first; legacy banks wrapped APIs around mainframes. The 5× gap reflects architecture.

How Much Better Can You Assess Credit Risk When You Can See Every Transaction?

Bayesian Credit Scoring with AIS Data:

Prior (traditional credit bureau):

$$P(\text{default}) = p_0 \quad \text{(based on credit score, age, income)}$$

Open Banking evidence $\mathbf{e}$:

$$\mathbf{e} = (\text{income regularity, spending patterns, balance volatility, gambling txn})$$

Posterior (Bayes' theorem):

$$P(\text{default} \mid \mathbf{e}) = \frac{P(\mathbf{e} \mid \text{default}) \cdot P(\text{default})}{P(\mathbf{e})}$$

Information gain (KL divergence):

$$D_{\text{KL}} = \sum_x P(\text{default} \mid \mathbf{e}) \log \frac{P(\text{default} \mid \mathbf{e})}{P(\text{default})}$$

Higher D_{KL} = more information gained from AIS data.

Empirical: AIS data increases Gini coefficient from 0.45 to 0.62 for thin-file borrowers.

Intuition

Traditional credit scoring: 5–10 variables (income, employment, credit history).

Open Banking credit scoring: 50–200 variables extracted from 12 months of transaction data.

Income regularity (salary deposits), spending discipline (savings ratio), risk signals (gambling, payday loans).

Thin-file borrowers (students, immigrants, gig workers) benefit most: AIS data provides signal where credit bureaus have none.

The information gain is highest for borrowers the traditional system excludes.

Privacy tension: the same data that enables inclusion also enables surveillance.

AIS data increases credit scoring accuracy by 38% for thin-file borrowers. The same data that enables financial inclusion also raises privacy concerns.

Did Open Banking Create More Freedom or More Dependency?

Promise	Reality	Paradox	Evidence
Eliminate bank lock-in	Created aggregator lock-in	Lock-in migrated up	Plaid 65% US share
Customer data ownership	Consent fatigue	Ownership without understanding	72% don't read consent
Lower switching costs	Multi-banking, not switching	Friction reduced but not removed	60%+ keep old bank
More competition	Winner-take-most in API layer	Competition shifted, not increased	HHI 4,700 (aggregators)
Innovation explosion	550+ TPPs, few profitable	Innovation without viability	80% TPPs pre-revenue
Lower costs	Total intermediation cost stable	Cost redistributed, not reduced	Philippon 2% holds

The openness paradox: PSD2 opened the vault, but the ecosystem that emerged is more complex, not more free. Lock-in migrated from banks to aggregators. Costs shifted from visible fees to invisible data monetization. The question is no longer WHETHER financial data is open, but WHO controls the infrastructure of openness.

The openness paradox: open banking did not eliminate intermediation. It created new intermediaries at the API layer – thinner, faster, but still present.

Key Takeaways

1. **Baumol's contestable markets theory** explains neobank disruption: when sunk costs approach zero (cloud, APIs, BaaS), even monopolies lose pricing power. PSD2 further reduces F_{reg} by mandating data portability.
2. **Neobank unit economics** require 2–5 year CAC payback and CLV/CAC $>$ 3x. With EU interchange capped at 0.2–0.3%, European neobanks MUST diversify into lending, insurance, and subscriptions – rebundling into banks.
3. **The four-party interchange model** shows that "free banking" is subsidized by merchants. EU IFR cut interchange by 40–60%, forcing revenue model innovation.
4. **PSD2's OAuth 2.0 architecture** ensures customers authenticate with their bank, not the TPP. Authorization codes are single-use, tokens are scoped, and credentials are never shared. Security by design.
5. **Network effects at the aggregation layer** (Metcalfe: $V \propto n^2$) recreated lock-in above the bank level. Plaid's 65% market share demonstrates winner-take-most dynamics in API infrastructure.
6. **The openness paradox**: PSD2 opened the vault but the ecosystem that emerged is more complex, not more free. Lock-in migrated from banks to aggregators. The total cost of financial intermediation remains at Philippon's 2%.

Next: Lesson 03 – P2P Lending and Robo-Advisory. How disintermediation attempts in lending and wealth management create new forms of intermediation.

References and Further Reading

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These references span contestable markets theory (1982), EU regulation (2015), and current industry reports (2024). Theory predicts; data validates.



2017: One vault. One key.



2025: Many windows. Many watchers.



2030: No vault.
No walls. No privacy?

Open Banking didn't just open one door – it opened so many that nobody knows who's watching.

The openness paradox: from one locked vault to many open windows to no walls at all. Freedom and exposure are the same thing.